Second paragraph of third chapter:
However, shortly afterwards, the situation took a sudden and dramatic new course when, on 30 September, the Serbian Parliament finally agreed the text of a new constitution. This was a long overdue move that had been spurred by Montenegro’s independence earlier in the year. Controversially, the text specifically referred to Kosovo as an integral part of the Republic of Serbia. While few seriously believed that this clause would have any real effect on the eventual outcome of the status talks – least of all Tadić, who had spoken out against the move3 – the announcement would almost certainly have an enormous effect on the timing of the process. For a start, a referendum would have to be held on the new constitution. This was scheduled for 28-29 October. Thereafter, it was almost certain that parliamentary elections would have to be called. These would be unlikely to take place before December. Once this had taken place, a new government would have to be formed. Based on previous efforts, this could also be a long process, taking weeks, if not months. Given Serbian sensitivities over Kosovo, few now believed that any final moves to address the issue of status could be made until most, if not all, of these different phases had been completed. Indeed, just days later, Ahtisaari acknowledged that the unveiling of his proposals would probably have to be postponed until after the elections. ⁴
⁴ ‘Serbian polls could delay Kosovo plan – Ahtisaari’, Reuters, 3 October 2006.
Actually quite a short book, with the operational section only 126 pages, followed by another 60 pages of primary source documents and almost the same again of GRRRRR endnotes, giving an account of the final status process (which I too was observing very closely at the time) and promising to “[explain] how and why things went so very wrong and [assess] where the responsibility for the failure to reach an agreed settlement really lies”.
I found it rather unsatisfactory. The case that “things went so very wrong” is not really made. Around 110 out of 193 UN member states now recognise Kosova’s independence, which is surely a critical mass; this is going in one direction rather than the other. And the simple fact is that there was never any sincere intention from Serbian leaders to “reach an agreed settlement”; there was no attempt to paint a realistic picture of a Serbian state which included Kosova with its current population, either for Serbian or for Kosovar consumption, let alone to negotiate on that basis. The Serbian leaders had their own good reasons for taking this position, and I don’t think international mediators can be blamed for failing to shift them.
The good part of the book is the blow-by-blow account of dates and participants at each of the various negotiation meetings involving the leaders of Serbia, Kosova and their international interlocutors; I don’t think I have seen the chronology set out so well anywhere else. But I had expected deeper analysis of the substance of the discussions. In particular, the crucial concept of ‘supervised independence’, which was an essential part of the eventual independence declaration of February 2008, isn’t examined at all. Nor is the question of special status for Serbian-majority municipalities within Kosova, which has turned out to be a major continuing pain point.
Instead the book blames Martti Ahtisaari, the UN mediator, for being partisan. This does not square with my own recollections, and interestingly is entirely based on off-hand remarks passed on at second hand from Western officials. But no matter who was in charge of the process, given the twin realities of a population 90% committed to independence, and a Serbian leadership unwilling to concede peacefully what they had lost militarily, the choice was always either an incomplete and grudging recognition of the Kosova state, or a frozen conflict à la Northern Cyprus, Transdnistria, Georgia, Abkhazia etc. (Or complete defeat as with Nagorno-Karabakh.) I tend to think that Kosova has ended up on the better track.
This was the shortest unread book on my shelves acquired in 2022 (and indeed it turned out to be shorter than I realised). Next on that pile is The Initials in the Heart, by Lawrence Whistler.
Meanwhile you can get Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans here.
