Second paragraph of third chapter (“Kosovo and Bosnia: Different Products of Yugoslavia’s Disintegration” by Jusuf Fuduli):
These include the ethnicities of the people involved, their proportion of the total population, the status of these entities as federal units in the former Yugoslavia, and the relations between the inhabitants before open conflict erupted. In terms of political definitions, the most pronounced differences between Bosnia and Kosovo are the political statuses afforded to each. While both Bosnia and Kosovo are subject to international oversight and the presence of an international peacekeeping force, the fact is that Bosnia requires an international mission to preserve its status as an independent state. This political status originates in its current form from the peace agreement known as the Dayton Accords signed in 1995 by the interested parties in the Bosnian conflict. Essentially, the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia will be required until the cement mixed at Dayton dries. Kosovo, unlike Bosnia, is not an example of a military solution being implemented to augment a political one. In Kosovo, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which provides the mandate for the international mission recognizes it as an interim solution until a final political settlement is achieved. This is the fundamental difference—Bosnia has a political solution defining its status and thereby guaranteeing the independence declared in 1992 that led to war, while Kosovo is still waiting for a settlement to answer its people’s own conflict ridden drive toward independence.
This is a massive 700-page book of essays on Kosovo from the American military point of view, pulled together by Wentz on behalf of the Pentagon’s Command and Control Research Program (reading between the lines, a Lessons Learned unit) back in 2002, which is a long time ago in Kosovo politics. It’s a real grab-bag of pieces, some from very senior writers, some from analysts who were clearly a bit shaky on the substance; Wentz himself contributes over a third of the book, in the form of a grunt’s-eye view of managing civil-military relations in an occupied but largely friendly territory, which is actually rather charming.
It could have been edited better – for instance, there are two consecutive chapters about NATO communications during the 1999 conflict, one of which persistently spells Jamie Shea’s name wrong, and the other actually by Shea himself, spelt correctly. I felt that there were possibly two different books in here, one on high strategy and one on the nuts and bolts of a medium-term military presence. But even so, there was the occasional moment when I nodded to myself and though, “Oh, so that’s why…”
In particular, it was pleasing to see the later chapters stressing the importance of relationships with civil society and international NGOs, and the various means by which these can be established, improved and maintained. The provision of maps to other international actors is a real boon, and saves lives. Information also needs to flow smoothly to where it is needed (the account of various secure comms systems and the different people allowed to use each one became almost funny in its complexity). So I hope that military planners, not only in the US, get a chance to read this book and learn from it.
You can download this book for free from the Pentagon here, though ironically the link gives a security warning and you may be more comfortable buying it here.
