Second paragraph of third chapter:

In this chapter I will seek to address three interlinked themes which underpin the narrative described above.  Firstly, I will examine the extent to which decimalisation was seen as diluting a British idea of identity based on exceptionalism; secondly I will discuss how this related to British efforts to join the European Common Market; and finally I will seek to determine the extent to which decimal currency was forced on an unwilling population.

In November 1963, the title character of a BBC science fiction episode called “An Unearthly Child” drew unwelcome attention to herself by thinking that the UK was already using a decimal currency. Of course, at the time there was no plan for decimalisation and the dialogue is meant to reinforce the science fiction credentials of the new show, Doctor Who, rather than to make serious predictions of the future.

I had read the last chapter of Andy Cook’s 2020 PhD thesis a couple of years ago, because of the role played by my grandfather in the Irish side of the story, but last month I sat down and read the whole thing. (Well, lay down really; it was bedtime reading for a few days.)

Cook here unpacks the politics behind the British government’s decision to move to a decimal currency in the late 1960s, and the choices that were made at the time. He rejects the right-wing rewriting of history which portrays the process as a plot by European integrationists to dilute British national identity; the consideration of the UK’s European future was a marginal issue (mainly because everyone in the political mainstream assumed that future European integration went without saying).

The two crucial practical factors were, first, that South Africa, Australia and New Zealand had gone ahead with decimalisation in the early to mid 1960s, moving away from the pounds, shillings and pence that they had inherited from the Empire; and second, that the development of business machines for sale internationally made the old system seem even more antiquated. There was no serious push against decimalisation at the time (though the old sixpence, now worth 2½p, was saved from oblivion for a few years).

I was surprised to find that the main controversy was whether the pound should be kept as the main unit, or whether a new currency worth ten shillings should be adopted, as had been done with the South African rand and the Australian and New Zealand dollars. (There was also a very small lobby for keeping the old penny and creating a new unit worth 8 shillings and 4 pence, ie 100 old pence.)

Here the Bank of England mobilised the City of London to lobby strongly for the retention of the pound, for the sake of continuity and international prestige, and James Callaghan, the Chancellor of the Excequer, was easily persuaded. Cook is hilarious about the lack of professional qualifications at the top of the British financial services industry in the 1960s, compensated by full participation in the various Old Boys Networks. The role of the Royal Mint, newly relocated to near Callaghan’s constituency in South Wales, seems also to have been a factor.

Cook also looks briefly, perhaps a bit too briefly, at the South African, Australian and New Zealand cases. The early 1960s British Conservative government had wanted to take any reforms slowly and in step with the major Commonwealth partners (and South Africa); but was then caught out when they went ahead without the UK, motivated by a desire to show independence. India too had decimalised the rupee in 1957 (and Pakistan in 1961), but the British seem to have felt that they had less to learn from countries that were not ruled by white people.

I have written about the Irish side of the story previously. The extra bit of context that I got from reading the rest of the thesis is that the notion of using a unit worth ten-shillings as the basis of a new Irish currency, which was the favoured option until quite late in the day when Jack Lynch and Charles Haughey together decided otherwise, was a reflection of the debates in the UK, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. In the end, the convenience of keeping the Irish currency linked to the UK, given that the two countries were effectively in a currency union, compelled even those (like my grandfather) who had originally backed the ten-shilling system to accept that the best solution was simply to copy the new UK coinage.

You can get the thesis here. I have done a cursory search for Andy Cook’s current co-ordinates on LinkedIn and other networks, but have not found him; I wonder what he is doing now?