I wrote in 2022 that the election system used by WSFS should be changed. At present, the rules for electing the Mark Protection Committee, the body charged with ensuring that the intellectual property of WSFS is protected, are set out in Standing Rule 6.2:
Voting shall be by written preferential ballot with write-in votes allowed. Votes for write-in candidates who do not submit written consent to nomination to the Presiding Officer before the close of balloting shall be ignored. The ballot shall list each nominee’s name. The first seat filled shall be by normal preferential ballot procedures as defined in Section 6.4 of the WSFS Constitution. There shall be no run-off candidate. After a seat is filled, votes for the elected member shall be eliminated before conducting the next ballot. This procedure shall continue until all seats are filled. In the event of a first-place tie for any seat, the tie shall be broken unless all tied candidates can be elected simultaneously. Should there be any partial-term vacancies on the committee, the partial-term seat(s) shall be filled after the full-term seats have been filled.
I warned that this carries the risk that a single faction with roughly half of the total votes could win every single seat and squeeze out other viewpoints.
My warning has come dramatically true. One of the candidates for this year’s MPC elections endorsed two other candidates and asked his supporters to transfer their votes to them. That candidate got almost half of the votes for the first seat and was easily elected; the two candidates who he endorse then took the second and third of the three seats up for grabs, thanks to votes transferred from the first candidate. This vividly demonstrates the potential for the current system to be gamed by slates.
What happened this year
The counts were as follows – with the winning candidate labelled C1 and the two who he supported labelled as C2 and C3; the other candidates are labelled D4 to D9 and DX for the tenth one. I’m removing names here because I don’t want to get into personalities.
| DX | D8, D9 | D7 | D6 | ||||||
| C1 | 67 | +1 | 68 | 68 | 68 | +1 | 69 | ||
| D4 | 23 | 23 | +2 | 25 | +3 | 28 | +2 | 30 | |
| D5 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | ||||
| C2 | 9 | 9 | +1 | 10 | 10 | +3 | 13 | ||
| C3 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | ||||
| D6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | +1 | 6 | -6 | – | ||
| D7 | 4 | 4 | +1 | 5 | -5 | – | – | ||
| D8 | 2 | 2 | -2 | – | – | – | |||
| D9 | 2 | 2 | -2 | – | – | – | |||
| DX | 1 | -1 | – | – | – | – | |||
| 138 | 138 | 138 | 137 | 137 | 
As you can see, C1 did very well on first preferences, but picked up only two transfers from the 14 votes that came from eliminated candidates. C2 and C3 were quite a long way behind in fourth and fifth place.
For the second round, C1’s votes were distributed to the next preference, and the results were very different. The first two columns here show the first preference votes from the first count, and then the number of votes gained from C1’s transfers.
| 1st | C1 | D9, DX | D8 | D7 | D6 | D5 | C3 | ||||||||
| C2 | 9 | 22 | 31 | +1 | 32 | +3 | 35 | +2 | 37 | +5 | 42 | +3 | 45 | +24 | 69 | 
| D4 | 23 | 5 | 28 | +2 | 30 | +1 | 31 | +4 | 35 | +4 | 39 | +10 | 49 | +8 | 57 | 
| C3 | 6 | 19 | 29 | +1 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | +5 | 35 | -35 | – | |||
| D5 | 19 | 1 | 20 | +1 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | -21 | – | – | ||||
| D6 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 9 | +1 | 10 | +1 | 11 | -11 | – | – | – | |||
| D7 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 7 | +1 | 8 | -8 | – | – | – | – | ||||
| D8 | 2 | 3 | 5 | +1 | 6 | -6 | – | – | – | – | – | ||||
| D9 | 2 | 1 | 3 | -3 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |||||
| DX | 1 | 2 | 3 | -3 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |||||
| 135 | 135 | 135 | 134 | 132 | 129 | 126 | 
Of C1’s 67 original votes, 41 followed C1’s advice to transfer to C2 and C3, putting them now first and second rather than fourth and fifth. Transfers from the other candidates coalesced around D4 – by the second last round, D4 had picked up 21 new votes, C2 had picked up 14 and C3 only 6. But C3’s votes were then transferred and broke to C2 by a ration of 3 to 1, electing C2 easily to the second seat. It should perhaps be added that as well as C1 having endorsed C2 and C3, they happen to live in the same city, so a strong rate of transfers could have been expected anyway.
For the third seat, I have broken out how many votes each candidate got in first preferences, then transfers from C1, then transfers from C2.
| 1st | C1 | C2 | D9 | DX | D7 | D6, D8 | D5 | |||||||
| C3 | 6 | 19 | 29 | 50 | 50 | +2 | 52 | 52 | +2 | 54 | +6 | 60 | ||
| D4 | 23 | 5 | 28 | +1 | 29 | +1 | 30 | +6 | 36 | +9 | 45 | +13 | 58 | |
| D5 | 19 | 1 | 2 | 22 | 22 | +1 | 23 | 23 | +2 | 25 | -25 | – | ||
| D8 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 9 | +1 | 10 | 10 | 10 | -10 | – | – | |||
| D6 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 9 | 9 | +1 | 10 | -10 | – | – | ||||
| D7 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 7 | +1 | 8 | -8 | – | – | – | ||||
| DX | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | +1 | 5 | -5 | – | – | – | – | |||
| D9 | 2 | 1 | 3 | -3 | – | – | – | – | – | |||||
| 132 | 132 | 132 | 131 | 124 | 118 | 
You’ll see that C3, who got only 6 votes in the first round, got a total of 48 transfers from C1 and C2 – which was just enough to get C3 elected ahead of D4. In the rounds of transfers up to the second last round, D4 picked up 17, C3 only 4. In the last round, D5 was eliminated and his votes were transferred; D5 and C3 (and C2) happen to live in the same city, so some of D5’s votes went to C3 as well.
But all in all, my 2022 prediction that a large enough minority would be able to take all of the seats in this electoral system has been proved by C1’s success in electing C2 and C3.
I note also that in the other election for a WSFS committee this year, where five seats were up for grabs, the same candidate came out as the loser in the first three rounds, and placed third in the last two rounds, with their support peaking at 49 votes out of 138. It’s quite likely that none of those 49 people voted for any of the five successful candidates. Of course, you can debate whether a particular committee is meant to have members who collectively represent the centre of gravity of the meeting’s views, or who represent the diversity of opinion present; but we should be clear that that choice is being made by the system we choose to use.
How this came about
We now reach the point where I should reveal a relevant point of information.
Candidate C1, who quite possibly brought C2 and C3 in on his coat-tails, was actually me.
I did not consult with Alan Bond (C2) and Chris Rose (C3) before suggesting that voters who supported me should transfer to them. I genuinely felt that their insights would be useful to have or to retain on the committee and, in an election where candidates may not be well known to voters, I thought it would be helpful to indicate who was closest to my own views. Neither Alan nor Chris endorsed me, or each other, and in fact I was the only candidate to express support for any of my competitors in that way. And of course lots of people voted for both of them, or for all three of us, without paying any attention to my recommendation
I think my own vote was helpfully inflated by a couple of factors. I made several successful interventions in the Business Meeting session the previous day. (Video here; I spoke nine times, the first time at 1:04:10 and the last at 3:33:45.) On the day that votes closed in the election, File 770 led its news roundup with a piece about that, and then linked to one of my blog posts a bit further down the same post; again, I did not communicate with Mike Glyer about that in any way. So there were no sneaky tricks here; it was entirely organic.
Obviously I’m very glad that Alan and Chris got elected, and I look forward to working with them and the rest of the committee. But I feel sorry for Bruce Farr (D4), who was only two votes short in the end. And the 58 people who voted for him are 42% of the total number of voters; it rather sucks that such a large chunk of the voter body ends up with zero seats out of three.
The solution
I was astonished when I first discovered how the MPC is elected. The runoff ballot in a succession of single-seat contests is appropriate enough for determine the winners and lower places of the Hugo Awards. It’s utterly inappropriate if you want to elect a diverse spread of people. (Maybe you don’t.)
In the real world, which is to say for all elections in both parts of Ireland and in Malta, and for the Australian Senate, and for municipal elections in Scotland, in New Zealand, in Cambridge (Massachusetts) and in Portland (Oregon), the single transferable vote is used and a candidate is elected if their vote exceeds the electoral quota, which is set to be a smidgeon above the number of valid votes cast, divided by one more than the number of seats.
If a candidate is elected, then their votes are transferred to other candidates at a smaller value, calculated as the ratio of transferable votes to the surplus over the quota, usually rounded to two or three decimal places. In the 2025 MPC election, with 138 votes in total for three seats, the quota would be just over 34.5 – let’s take it to three decimal places and say 34.501. We can actually get a pretty good sense of how such an election would have worked out, using the votes actually cast this year. (The voter experience of the current system would not have changed; you still rank as many candidates, in order, as you want to.)
I got 67 first preferences, which is 32.499 votes over the quota. 64 of my votes had second preferences (see the first column of my breakdown of the second seat count, above). They would all be given a new value of 64 ÷ 32.499 = 0.507. So the first two counts would have looked like this:
| Count 1 | C1 surplus | Count 2 | |
| C1 Whyte | 67 | -32.499 | 34.501 | 
| D4 Farr | 23 | +2.535 (5 votes) | 25.535 | 
| C2 Bond | 9 | +11.154 (22 votes) | 20.154 | 
| D5 Dunn | 19 | +0.507 (1 vote) | 19.507 | 
| C3 Rose | 6 | +11.661 (23 votes) | 17.661 | 
| D6 Hertel | 5 | +2.028 (4 votes) | 7.028 | 
| D7 Ross-Mansfield | 4 | +1.521 (3 votes) | 5.521 | 
| D8 Black | 2 | +1.521 (3 votes) | 3.521 | 
| D9 Rudolph | 2 | +0.507 (1 vote) | 2.507 | 
| DX Oakes | 1 | +1.014 (2 votes) | 2.014 | 
| Non-transferable | +0.051 | ||
| 138 | 137.949 | 
The number of non-transferable votes recorded is an accounting artifact – it represents the value that gets lost in rounding to three decimal places. If we had gone for two decimal places, the quota would have been 34.51 and the value of the transferred votes would have been 0.50, which I don’t think would have changed the projected outcome much.
We can actually go a bit further in our alternate timeline. The data is incomplete, and I am assuming that the one vote that transferred to me went on to transfer to Alan Bond, but we can be fairly sure that after the bottom three candidates had been eliminated (which would have been done one by one in real life), the numbers would have looked something like this:
| Count 1 | C1 surplus | Count 2 | D8, D9, DX | Count 5 | |
| C1 Whyte | 67 | -32.499 | 34.501 | 34.501 | |
| D4 Farr | 23 | +2.535 | 25.535 | +2.507 | 28.042 | 
| C2 Bond | 9 | +11.154 | 20.154 | +2.521 | 23,166 | 
| D5 Dunn | 19 | +0.507 | 19.507 | +0.507 | 20.014 | 
| C3 Rose | 6 | +11.661 | 17.661 | +0.507 | 18.168 | 
| D6 Hertel | 5 | +2.028 | 7.028 | +0.507 | 7.535 | 
| D7 Ross-Mansfield | 4 | +1.521 | 5.521 | +1.000 | 6.521 | 
| D8 Black | 2 | +1.521 | 3.521 | -3.521 | – | 
| D9 Rudolph | 2 | +0.507 | 2.507 | -2.507 | – | 
| DX Oakes | 1 | +1.014 | 2.014 | -2.014 | – | 
| N/t | +0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | ||
| 138 | 137.949 | 137.949 | 
Again we can’t break them down individually, but from the numbers we have, we can be fairly sure that the votes from candidates D6 and D7 would have transferred something like this:
| Count 1 | C1 surplus | Count 2 | D8, D9, DX | Count 5 | D6, D7 | Count 7 | |
| C1 Whyte | 67 | -32.499 | 34.501 | 34.501 | 34.501 | ||
| D4 Farr | 23 | +2.535 | 25.535 | +2.507 | 28.042 | +6.521 | 34.563 | 
| C2 Bond | 9 | +11.154 | 20.154 | +2.521 | 23,166 | +5.028 | 28.196 | 
| D5 Dunn | 19 | +0.507 | 19.507 | +0.507 | 20.014 | 20.014 | |
| C3 Rose | 6 | +11.661 | 17.661 | +0.507 | 18.168 | 18.168 | |
| D6 Hertel | 5 | +2.028 | 7.028 | +0.507 | 7.535 | -7.535 | |
| D7 Ross-Mansfield | 4 | +1.521 | 5.521 | +1.000 | 6.521 | -6.521 | |
| D8 Black | 2 | +1.521 | 3.521 | -3.521 | – | ||
| D9 Rudolph | 2 | +0.507 | 2.507 | -2.507 | – | ||
| DX Oakes | 1 | +1.014 | 2.014 | -2.014 | – | ||
| N/t | +0.051 | 0.051 | 0.051 | +2.507 | 2.556 | ||
| 138 | 137.949 | 137.949 | 135.442 | 
So, in a big turnaround from the real life situation, candidate D4 secures the second of the three seats, just creeping over the quota by 0.062 of a vote, with the last seat to be decided between C2 and D5 by C3’s transfers. In the real life election for the second seat, C3’s transfers broke in favor of C2 by a ratio of three to one; we don’t know how many of those were C3’s 6 first preferences and how many were the 23 transferred votes from C1, but it’s clear that C2, who was already 8 votes ahead of D5, would have been the greater beneficiary and would have won the final seat.
Obviously this outcome would have suited my personal agenda less, but I think it would have been a more representative result than the one we had in real life. It also would take a shorter time, because most of the votes would only be counted once.
How to get there
If we went to a multi-member transferable vote system, there are a few technical decisions we’d need to make. One of them is that we shouldn’t transfer surpluses, the operation that has the most work attached, unless the total of the surplus could potentially affect the outcome. In the worked example above, D4 has a surplus of only 0.062 of a vote, which is not enough to save C3 from elimination. WSFS already differs from standard practice by eliminating losing candidates one at a time, even if the lowest-placed candidate’s votes couldn’t possibly make up the difference between the second and third lowest, but I don’t think we have to do that for surpluses too. (If we had taken the value at two rather than three decimal places, D4 would not have reached the quota before the final round.)
The other technical point is, which surplus votes do you actually transfer in later rounds? In Ireland the practice is to just transfer the last votes that came in, which in the worked example above would mean only looking at the votes that D4 got from D6 (probably 2 full value votes and 2 worth 0.507; in total, D4 has 30 full-value votes and 9 at a value of 0.507). There are two reasons for this: in theory, the people who voted for D4 at an earlier stage have already got full value for their votes, and it’s the ones whose votes arrived last who create the surplus; and in practice, it makes the count much easier and more efficient. I understand, however, that the Australians do it differently and redistribute all of the votes that a winning candidate has ever received.
I have seen it argued that since the election method for the Mark Protection Committee is set out in the Standing Rules, it requires only a majority vote at a single Business Meeting to change it. I suspect that rather than go for a change immediately, a suitable intermediate step would be to create a working group next year to report in 2027, which could look at other alternatives too (though I think they’ll end up here once they have looked at the alternatives). This isn’t something that you should try and suspend standing orders for, in order to sneak it through at the last moment. (Very few things are.)
Also worth noting: less than 10% of the votes were cast for women, and all the candidates (as far as I know) identify as white. (The other committee had less than 16% of first preferences cast for men, though a man won the fifth seat.) I don’t know what we can do about that, but I do identify it as a problem. Probably for another day, though.
