The Partition: Ireland Divided, 1885-1925, by Charles Townshend

Second paragraph of third chapter:

Ironically it was one of the most prominent younger radicals, David Lloyd George, who as Chancellor of the Exchequer indirectly recharged the home rule project. The rejection of his 1909 ‘people’s budget’ by the House of Lords – breaking the unwritten convention that the upper house did not interfere with money matters – triggered a constitutional crisis which ended, after two narrow Liberal general election victories in 1910, in legislation to abolish the Lords’ veto power. The 1911 Parliament Act made possible not only death duties, but also Irish home rule. As the Act passed, the prime minister H. H Asquith announced that a third home rule bill would be brought forward. Enraged Tories denounced this as the result of a ‘corrupt bargain’ to keep the Liberals in power with Irish support – the budget was disliked by the influential Irish liquor trade, and home rule was the price of pushing it through. There was probably no deal as such, and the Liberals had in any case, thanks to Labour support, a comfortable majority. ‘A general understanding’ that home rule would follow, it has been reasonably suggested, was ‘surely the natural result of the long history of Liberal commitment’ to it.³
³ P. Jalland, The Liberals and Ireland: The Ulster Question in British Politics to 1914 (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), 29.

I very much enjoyed Townshend’s Ewart-Biggs-Prize-winning The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923, so had pretty high expectations here, combined with fairly fresh memories of Ronan Fanning’s Fatal Path: British Government and Irish Revolution 1910-1922. I don’t think you could read The Partition without also having read The Republic, or something similar – the story of how Northern Ireland came to be created is really a sidenote to the much bigger story of Irish independence, and Townshend has sensibly not repeated much from the previous book, which means that some important context is skimmed here.

But it doesn’t matter all that much, because this is a deep dive into archival sources and also (often neglected) contemporary newspaper accounts of the process of the partition of Ireland, which Townshend rightly puts as beginning in 1885 when the election results revealed that Nationalism was dominant everywhere in Ireland except in the north-east, and the question of how, or indeed if, Ulster could be incorporated into a future self-governing Ireland became a real one.

Map of 1885 election results from Wikipedia

One part of the book was completely new to me: the confused and violent situation in Northern Ireland, especially Belfast, as the new government under James Craig was being set up and at the same time under ineffective but visible attack by Michael Collins from the south. There was a real intermixture of Loyalist militias of varying degrees of effectiveness and state support that would hold its own with many of today’s conflicts, including the bloody ethnic cleansing. Nobody comes out of this episode well, including the British government which was wilfully ignorant of events in Belfast, Derry and the border counties.

The last chapter, not surprisingly, looks at the history of the Boundary Commission, which started late and badly. The chairman was a South African judge, but from the imperialist side; the Northern Ireland government refused to appoint its commissioner, so London imposed a journalist who of course leaked proceedings to Craig; and the Irish Free State nominated Eoin MacNeill, the confused academic who had unsuccessfully countermanded the Easter Rising in 1916, by now Minister for Education.

Townshend spends some time wondering why Cosgrave did not instead appoint Kevin O’Shiel, who was an expert on boundaries and constitutions, but I think the answer is clear: MacNeill had the political heft and was actually an elected member of the Northern Ireland Parliament (though he never took his seat), whereas O’Shiel (despite his best efforts) was a mere political adviser. MacNeill, however, was thoroughly outmanoeuvred by the other Commissioners and secretariat, and only managed to exert some control of the process by resigning just before the report was due to be published, thus torpedoing the entire exercise. (I believe another book published this year is even more critical of him.)

Nationalists like to find villains for the crime of partition, but the fact is that Nationalist leaders failed to grasp the fact that the Ulster situation was a very serious impediment for their political project. Townshend doesn’t go into it, but much Nationalist rhetoric and indeed behaviour was intentionally offensive to those who they claimed as fellow citizens. Parnell, as a Protestant landlord himself, rather adopted the zeal of the convert, and no Nationalist leadership figure had credibility among Unionists. In the later stages, I think that Redmond missed a trick here, and in other respects, by refusing to accept a Cabinet position – it would have been tough going, but he would have had the threat of resignation in his dwindling armory. I very much agree with Townshend’s conclusion:

Almost nobody wanted it; but any implication that a better arrangement was possible, and somehow squandered through haste and carelessness, would be misleading. The intensity of Unionist hostility to home rule presented a political challenge of exceptional difficulty. Once Joseph Chamberlain had talked of a separate parliament for Ulster, it would have needed a major reconstruction of nationalist ideas to make a unitary home rule arrangement viable. That adaptation was not made, or even attempted, mainly because nationalists were doomed to believe that any resistance within Ireland to home rule was illusory. Even amongst others, partition was never embraced with enthusiasm. It was a negative concept, connoting at best failure, at worst abuse of statesmanship.

Townshend also looks briefly at why neither power-sharing nor UK-wide federalism could have flown. My own reflection on those points is that nobody ever suggested guaranteed positions in Irish government for the Unionists, at least not until the creation of the Free State in 1922 (when Collins basically gave them what they asked for, most importantly short-term over-representation in the new Senate). And the notion of ‘Home Rule all round’ failed to recognised the asymmetry between Irish demands on the one hand and Scottish and Welsh aspirations on the other. (And indeed between Scotland and Wales. Bear in mind that devolution was rejected by a 4 to 1 majority in Wales in 1979, and scraped through by just under 7,000 votes out of over a million cast in 1997.)

I don’t think this is a book for beginners, but those who already know a bit – even a lot – about the period will find some very interesting new information. You can get The Partition here.

This was my top unread book acquired in 2021, and the non-fiction book that had lingered longest on my shelves. Next on those piles respectively are Burning Brightly: 50 Years of Novacon, ed. Ian Whates, and Het lijkt Washington wel: Hoe lobbyisten Brussel in hun greep hebben, by Peter Teffer.

The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923, by Charles Townshend

Second paragraph of third chapter:

Martial law was restricted to the south-west to keep Dublin open for those, in Sturgis’s jokey phrase, ‘as wants to negotiate’. A few on both sides seem to have wanted to. They found a new intermediary in Patrick Joseph Clune, Archbishop of Perth, a man with some experience of the war — he had been visiting his native Clare at the time of the Rineen ambush and the reprisals that followed it, and his nephew had died in Dublin Castle along with McKee and Clancy on Bloody Sunday. Shortly after the Kilmichael ambush he was enlisted by Joe Devlin as a go-between, and spent most of December moving between Dublin and London, talking to Griffith in prison, and twice to the Prime Minister, who certified him as ‘thoroughly loyal’.1 He seems to have drafted agreed truce terms that included immunity for Collins and Mulcahy.
1 Lloyd George to Greenwood, 2 Dec. 1920. HLRO F/19/1/28.

This won the Christopher Ewart-Biggs Memorial Prize in 2015, along with a special mention for The Whole and Rain-Domed Universe, by Colette Bryce. It took me a while to get around to reading it, but I found it a tremendous book – a blow-by-blow account of the Irish War of Independence and the Civil War, looking pretty neutrally at both British and Irish records and coming to some interesting conclusions. Like most Irish people with any interest in history, I was pretty familiar with the outlines of the story, which meant that the new details were very interesting indeed.

Going through it chronologically, there are points of interest in each of the long chapters. The British conceded a massive chunk of territory, quite literally, by evacuating small rural police stations as soon as the first trouble began in mid to late 1919. The Royal Irish Constabulary were more of a paramilitary law enforcement agency than a community police force, but even so, the withdrawal to fortified regional redoubts basically conceded the monopoly on the use of force to the IRA. This created space for the Dáil court system to start functioning a year or so later – the received history is that the Dáil courts were a turning point, but in fact they could not have functioned if the police had been, well, policing.

In 1920 the IRA worked out how to fight a guerilla war more or less from first principles, with ultimately the introduction of the Black and Tans, whose violence shifted what remained of neutral opinion in most of Ireland towards separatism, culminating in Bloody Sunday. This is one part of the generally believed narrative that Townshend confirms. But even so there are some interesting wrinkles. The strike of railway workers – or rather, their refusal to carry British troops on the trains – was a serious blow to British mobility. And also, British policy itself was completely unhinged, with no medium to long term goals – if they were to win the war, what next? But they were too poorly organised to have a chance of winning, with lines of control at the top (and indeed middle) deeply obscure.

1921 saw the two sides edging towards a truce, and eventually to the December 1921 Treaty. What’s especially interesting is that both sides were motivated to keep talking because neither believed that they could win if war resumed. My father always used to say that most armies are so badly organised that it’s just as well that they only ever have to fight other armies. The turning point here, and I guess I knew this but had not seen it that way before, was the election in May. The British commanders had assured the government at the start of the year that they would have crushed dissent by late spring, so the elections were duly scheduled and organised. But in fact Sinn Féin won every seat outside the new territory of Northern Ireland (er, and Trinity college Dublin), unopposed. As Asquith put it (not quoted by Townshend, but I’ve seen it elsewhere), London gave Ulster a parliament that it did not particularly want, and the rest of Ireland a parliament which it would not have.

1922-23 saw the difficulties in implementing the Treaty eventually spill over into the Civil War. I had not realised quite how quickly the Republican side basically lost the war by default. They assumed that as in 1919-21, the latent support of the people as a whole would sustain them and delegitimise the Collins / Griffith / Cosgrave government; and they controlled large parts of the south and west of the country, and two small but strategic parts of Dublin. But the Free Staters picked off the areas of Republican strength one by one, and retaliated brutally to individual attacks by executing prisoners; meanwhile the Legion of the Rearguard waited for a popular revolt that never happened.

It’s a great chronology. I do have two complaints. There is not enough about Northern Ireland / Ulster; Townshend remarks several times that Collins rather ignored it, but is somewhat guilty of doing the same himself. On the other hand, there is too much about political ideology. The understanding of the Republic mattered a lot to many of the participants, De Valera in particular, and not only him. but I find it personally rather difficult to grasp.

Anyway, this is a great book which anyone interested in that place and time should read. You can get it here.

This was the non-fiction book that had lingered longest unread on my shelves. Next on that pile is a Bolivian government production, El Libro del Mar (fortunately in English), if I can find it. If I can’t, the next will be Neither Unionist nor Nationalist: the 10th (Irish) Division in the Great War, by Stephen Sandford.

Ewart-Biggs Prize winners: Observe the Sons of Ulster Marching Towards the Somme, by Frank McGuinness | From A Clear Blue Sky: Surviving the Mountbatten Bomb, by Timothy Knatchbull | Setting the Truth Free: The Inside Story of the Bloody Sunday Campaign, by Julieann Campbell | The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923, by Charles Townshend | The Whole and Rain-Domed Universe, by Colette Bryce | The Sun is Open, by Gail McConnell

March Books 10) Easter 1916

10) Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion, by Charles Townshend

Saw this reviewed in the Guardian last year, and then saw it excoriated on a couple of Republican websites, and thought it would probably be an interesting read.

And it is. I guess most people reading this will at least be aware of what I was brought up to call the Easter Rising (Townshend prefers “rebellion”, for reasons which are well argued), most memorably portrayed in the opening section of Neil Jordan’s film about Michael Collins (where you may remember that Dev has mysteriously been transported to the GPO from the other side of the river, and the building appears to face south rather than east). A few hundred rebels seized control of central Dublin on Easter Monday, 1916, and eventually were shelled out by the British as they retook the city; while most of the leaders were shot by firing squad, the survivors became the nucleus of the political movement that fought for and then ruled the independent Irish state that emerged in 1921. It is generally regarded as one of the turning points in Irish history; and while Townshend tries to cast some doubt on that assessment, he doesn’t really succeed, carried away as he is by the drama of the topic. There’s lots of detail here, and some very interesting analysis as well.

The most extraordinary finding for me was the true extent of British repression in the run-up to 1916: specifically, that there was so little of it. MI5 employed 1453 people as postal censors in England, Scotland and Wales by the end of 1915. In Ireland there were precisely ten people doing the job, five in Belfast and five in Dublin. Of course, the Post Office, as it turns out, was pretty heavily infiltrated by militant nationalists anyway, so it might not have done any good; but they simply were not trying. (The fact that the GPO was the headquarters at Easter 1916 is not especially relevant here.) The government had no intelligence capability – or rather, there were a number of intelligence-gathering agencies, but they don’t seem to have been reporting to anyone, and no effort appears to have been made to find out who exactly was in control of the various armed militias parading around the place, let alone what their political agenda and concrete plans might be. Even the Pope had been told that an Easter rebellion was planned, but the British were caught completely by surprise. The authorities had given up trying to enforce even the limited extra wartime repressive measures offered by the Defence of the Realm Act within six months of the war breaking out. No wonder that they were caught napping (or, to be more accurate, out at the races) when the rebellion began on Easter Monday. Townshend feels that the liberal character of British legal culture, even in its weaker Irish reflection, was too heavily engrained; I’m inclined to just put it down to sheer incompetence.

The legal theme continues through and after the rebellion. The Lord Lieutenant, desperately swigging brandy (like his first cousin Winston Churchill), declared martial law on the Monday, without any clear idea of what this would mean. This was then the justification for the most memorable and transformational episode of the entire affair – the execution in Dublin after secret court-martial of 14 of the rebels, including almost all the leadership. While this was by far the most drastic measure taken by the British state to defend itself, there were others, combining over-zealous repression with legal tail-spin: the internment without trial, on dubious grounds, of 1600 Irish prisoners (over a thousand of whom were then released because, essentially, there was no evidence against them); the authorities’ refusal to publish the official records of the courts-martial at which prisoners had been condemned to death; the cabinet’s repeated discussions of Roger Casement’s pending execution – Townshend quotes Roy Jenkins, “There can be few other examples of a Cabinet devoting large parts of four separate meetings to considering an individual sentence – and then arriving at the wrong decision.” (Townshend then notes that Jenkins was wrong – the Cabinet discussed the matter at least five times.)

Turning to the other side of the story, I also found very impressive Townshend’s reconstruction, practically from the historiographical equivalent of trace fossils, of why Easter 1916 was planned as it was. Since all the people who actually knew what was going on had been executed within a few days of the end of the rebellion, and almost all the documentation, if it ever existed, had been lost, this was not an easy task. But he does a good job – significantly, many of the survivors among the rebels had been (or at least later claimed to have been) proponents of the guerilla warfare model that indeed was successful between 1919 and 1921, rather than the urban seizure which Pearse, fascinated as he was by Robert Emmett’s 1803 adventure, had fixated on early in his career. Emmett, of course, didn’t even manage to lead his rebels to the end of Thomas Street; but for Pearse, and for Joseph Mary Plunkett, who actually wrote the plan for 1916 (such as it was), that was hardly the point. William Irwin Thompson’s The Imagination of an Insurrection argues that the entire Rising makes sense considered as a work of heroic literature to waken the country rather than as a military act, and if considered in those terms it must be considered a success. There is a certain desperate poetry in the only document of Plunkett’s relating to the Rising that does survive, a notebook found lying in the street after it was all over, which ends with the scribbled notes:

Food to Arnotts
Order to remain all posts unless surrounded
Barricades in front
Henry St
Food

He’s also very good on the actual events leading up to and surrounding the outbreak of the rebellion. There had been a scare from a leaked Dublin Castle document apparently planning for repressive measures to be taken in the event of introducing conscription. This led to the ramping up of tension and expectation, and seemed to offer an excuse to start the rebellion on Easter Sunday. Eoin MacNeill, of course, countermanded the orders; but as things turned out, he was not fully in control, and the rebellion went ahead, though on a smaller scale, on Easter Monday instead. A strength of the book is his description of what happened outside Dublin – more than is usually recounted, including relatively successful operations in Louth and Meath, and a dignified surrender with no lives (or even weapons) lost in Cork, for which both the British forces and the Cork rebels were duly chastised by their colleagues.

One of Townshend’s more irritating habits is to describe the various military tactics pursued by the 1916 rebels, point out why they were flawed on any serious military analysis, and then wonder aloud why the rebels took this course. OK, so some decisions were indeed blindingly stupid – why the GPO, for heaven’s sake (whatever Peter Berresford Ellis may say), rather than Dublin Castle, or the actual phone exchanges in Crown Alley and Store Street? Why St Stephen’s Green, surrounded by tall buildings, rather than the citadel of Trinity College? Above all, why was no provision made for, well, provisions, so that by the end of the week the surviving rebels surrendered as much due to starvation as due to military defeat? But the answer, to me anyway, is pretty obvious: military victory was not, in fact, their chief goal. They did have a vague hope that they might hold out until the Germans came to rescue them, but no real evidence for this – indeed, Roger Casement was actually arrested on his way to tell the leadership explicitly that no German help would be forthcoming. (It’s not entirely clear why the socialist radical James Connolly chose to unite his Irish Citizens Army with the larger nationalist – but not socialist group. He obviously wanted an armed revolution himself; did he imagine that a) the rebellion would succeed, and b) he would gain control of a post-revolutionary government? But of course he was also deluded enough to believe that the capitalists would not use heavy artillery against commercial property.)

Moving back a bit, I was very interested in the argument in an early chapter that Redmond and the Irish Party had irretrievably lost their credibility as early as 1915. Redmond, as leader of the Irish Nationalists, had taken a huge gamble by committing them to the service of the British during the first world war. He was comprehensively screwed over by two factors. First, the British army (Lord Kitchener in particular) decided not to incorporate the existing Irish Nationalist paramilitary structures into the army, with symbols and regimental identity etc, as was done for the Ulster Volunteers. The Commander of the 10th Division (in which my own grandfather fought) was “described in the divisional history as ‘an Irishman without politics’, but of course this meant he was a Protestant and an unthinking, not to say pig-headed conservative.” Second, the war lasted a lot longer than people expected, which meant that Home Rule was now put off for far longer than the few months originally anticipated and that Redmond’s main political role collapsed into being a British recruiting sergeant. Meanwhile the war was not going well. The only news most people were getting from the Western front was the telegram telling them their sons were dead. And while wages were frozen but prices rising all over the United Kingdom, it was in Ireland that wages were lowest and fewest jobs were created on foot of the war effort. In November 1915, Redmond was condemned in unprecedented terms by a Catholic bishop, who declared of the potential Irish recruits heading to America to escape any potential conscription, “Their blood is not stirred by memories of Kossovo, and they have no burning desire to die for Serbia.”

It’s an interesting and even slightly attractive argument, which goes completely against the orthodoxy that British repression following Easter 1916 turned Sinn Fein into a more credible political force than the tired Redmondites, but that up until then the older political party’s position might have been salvageable. Rather to my surprise, after outlining his (to me) revolutionary and innovative analysis of the 1914-16 period, Townshend appears to retreat back into that orthodoxy in later chapters dealing with the 1916-18 period, which made me wonder if he really believed his own argument. He returns to it to speculate that, had there been no rebellion, there would have been a fatal crisis in 1918 anyway over conscription, leading to a political victory for more extreme nationalist forces, as Alvin Jackson seems to suggest in one of those alternate history books. Hmm.

A few other historiographical points. Townshend clearly sees himself as in the “revisionist” camp of Irish history, and will no doubt have been duly delighted by the republican rants against his book that I mentioned earlier. It’s all a load of nonsense. Anyone interested in Irish history, of whatever political views, should be grateful to him for pulling this material together and in particular for the wealth of detail about the precise military facts of what happened. Havig said that, I was a bit unsatisfied on a couple of historical points. I was left unclear as to why Townshend believes that Bulmer Hobson was written out of the history of the Rising, in that he doesn’t give examples of earlier accounts which omit or minimise him, and my own reading has tended to be from the more recent end of things anyway which counts him in. Likewise I was a little baffled by his defensiveness of the heads of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, W.V. Harrel and Sir John Ross of Bladensburgh (whose botanical correspondence I once riffled through, in a different life), who on any reasonable reading of the facts bore at least some responsibility for the Bachelor’s Walk shootings in July 1914.

Three other peculiar little things noted here for completeness. Sean T. O’Kelly believed he had been appointed “Civil Administrator of the Government of the Republic”. Almost thirty years later, he was elected President of the real thing. De Valera’s surrender in Jacob’s biscuit factory – Owen Dudley Edwards suggested that Dev was in the end over-ruled by his officers, but Townshend has him in control right the way through. And he quotes from an account of the defence of Trinity College, published anonymously, though I happen to know that the author was the TCD physicist John Joly.

Anyway, an excellent book. Though I would like to know more about the revolutionary implications of the bicycle.