I’m sure they’re sleeping easier in Beijing now

FOREIGN MINISTER OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO SUPPORTS CHINA’S ANTI-SEPARATIST LAW. The Foreign Ministry of Serbia and Montenegro announced on 14 March that Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic fully supports China’s new law against separatism, Tanjug reported. The statement came after Chinas’ ambassador to Belgrade, Li Guobang, informed the ministry about the new law. (From RFE/RL, by UB)

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So tell me…

Geoff Pullum, over at Language Log, found himself understandably irritated by Frank Delaney’s assertion that there is no word for “sex” in Irish. He consulted a friend, who gave him this list:

ag déanamh pís ghlaice
ag ealáin
an cleas a dhéanamh
collaíocht
craiceann a bhualadh
craiceann a dhéanamh
cuid a dhéanamh de
focáil
gnéas
Sadly, of course, I chose to learn German rather than Irish at school. So can anyone enlighten me as to what these intriguing words and phrases actually mean?

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Squee!

Just received a very friendly letter from an actual prime minister, unprovoked, asking me to drop by his office next time I’m in his country. I’ve never met him. I don’t think I’ll ever get used to that kind of thing!

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Venice Commission on Bosnia-Herzegovina

by Brussels Gonzo (originally published on A Fistful of Euros)

Teekay was looking forward to the Venice Commission’s report on Bosnia-Herzegovina last week. (The Venice Commission, for those of you who don’t lie awake at nights in excited anticipation of its next publication, is the constitutional reform advisory body of the Council of Europe, which in turn is not to be condused with the European Council.)

Well, the report’s out – not yet on their website but they’ve sent me a copy. It’s not as radical as some in Bosnia-Herzegovina might have liked, but given the Venice Commission’s normally relatively anodyne pronouncements it’s pretty strong stuff.

The conclusions are as follows (all emphasis is mine):

The Commission appreciates the fact that the use of the Bonn powers by the High Representative was beneficial for BiH and its citizens and a necessity following a bloody war. However, this practice does not correspond to democratic principles when exercised without due process and the possibility of judicial control. Its justification becomes more questionable over time. The Commission therefore calls for a progressive phasing out of these powers and for the establishment of an advisory panel of independent lawyers for the decisions directly affecting the rights of individuals pending the end of the practice. [Good call on this one, by the way, Teekay!] While BiH may still need more guidance from the international community, this could be provided by more subtle means. At present, the High Representative is at the same time the EU Special Representative. If he were to retain only the role of EU Special Representative comparable to the practice in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” [sic, including quotation marks], this would allow the transformation of the role of the High Representative from a decision-maker into that of a mediator. The interest of the people of BiH in European integration should ensure the effectiveness of this role.

To sum up, the time seems ripe to start a process of reconsideration of the present constitutional arrangements in BiH and the impetus provided by the Parliamentary Assembly [of the Council of Europe] in this respect is most welcome. Constitutional reform is indispensable since present arrangements are neither efficient nor rational and lack democratic content.

A central element of the first stage of constitutional reform has to be a transfer of responsibilities from the Entities to BiH by means of amendments to the BiH Constitution. This is an indispensable step if any progress is to be achieved in the process of European integration of BiH. This step will be difficult since, as with other constitutional amendments in BiH, it will have to be based on consensus among the representatives of the three constituent peoples. Constitutional reform cannot be imposed. Another element of the first stage should be a streamlining of decision-making procedures within BiH, especially with respect to the vital interest veto, and a reform of the provisions on the composition and election of the Presidency and the House of Peoples which seem either now or following the entry into force of Protocol No. 12 on 1 April 2005 incompatible with the ECHR. The reform of the vital interest veto at the State level could best be carried out in parallel with similar reforms in both Entities.

Another pressing issue is the territorial organisation of BiH. In the view of the Venice Commission, any solution implying abolishing the two Entities seems unrealistic in a medium term perspective since this would not be accepted within the RS. A reform of the structures within the FBiH cannot be put on hold in the vague hope of a change of approach in the RS. The most realistic option for such reform, which would also be in line with general European trends, would be to concentrate legislative responsibilities within the FBiH at the Entity level. At the same time, local government in both the FBiH and the RS should be strengthened. Completely abolishing the Cantons would be an even better solution but this may not be politically possible for the moment.

Further constitutional reforms, changing the emphasis from a state based on the equality of three constituent peoples to a state based on the equality of citizens, remain desirable in the medium and long term. If the interests of individuals are conceived as being based mainly on ethnicity, this impedes the development of a wider sense of nationhood. In this context the people of BiH will also have to decide whether they want to replace their present Constitution negotiated as part of a peace treaty by an entirely new Constitution which would enjoy full democratic legitimacy as the fruit of a democratic constituent process in BiH.

(Apologies for the length of the quote, but this important document is not yet widely available, although I have been told that the text here is considered final and public.)

So there we have it: no striking down by the Commission of either the High Representative’s powers or of the entity/canton structure, as some were hoping for, but instead a prescription for a reform agenda to create a workable state out of the constitutional dog’s breakfast that Bosnia-Herzegovina was left with as a result of the Washington (1994) and Dayton (1995) agreements.

Most significantly, the onus for action is largely left with local actors. If the people(s) of Bosnia-Herzegovina want a better constitution, they will largely have to negotiate it themselves, with perhaps external mediation but with no prospect of external imposition. After all, imposing the current constitutions is what gave rise to this in the first place.

(PS to my hosts: Can you fix the styles definition here so that <blockquote> doesn’t result in monstrously huge text? I’d have preferred to use <blockquote> rather than italics for the quote above.)

Comments

Well… as you say, by the standards of the Venice Commission it’s pretty spicy stuff. However, as so often in this part of the world, it looks like good intentions are leading straight to the door marked “All Hope Abandon, etc.”

Let’s review the bidding:

1) Constitutional reform is “indispensable”.

2) Constitutional reform must transfer responsibilities (and, presumably, /power/… is there a formal rule that this word can’t be used in this sort of discussion, or is it just a very strong convention?) from the entities to BiH.

3) Constitutional reform cannot be imposed.

Now. Given the current composition of the legislative and executive branches of the BiH entities, voluntary constitutional reform giving power to the center seems about as likely as, hm, me flying to the Moon by putting my head between my legs and spitting /really hard/.

It’s of course possible that the good people of BiH may change their minds and elect… well, they’re not going to elect a bunch of non-nationalist technocrats. But maybe they’ll elect some folks who are a bit less interested in jingoistic posturing and a bit more in getting stuff done? Maybe they’ll get tired of the current bunch of dickheads, and willing to try something new?

Perhaps. But based on the experience of BiH’s neighbors, it’s going to require at least one full electoral wash-and-rinse cycle, and probably more, before this even begins to happen. And then maybe it, well, won’t.

I have to say, visiting the two communities does not fill one with hope. They’re teaching their kids different histories, they’re clinging to the old out of fear, and their leaders are still playing the same old tunes over and over and over. It’s easy to see why they’re re-electing the dickheads. What’s harder to see is when and why they’ll stop doing so.

All that said, I do give the Venice folks kudos for spotting the thread that (maybe) dangles out of the knot: the High Rep. Nothing’s going to happen as long as there’s a proconsul who’s really running things, leaving the elected representatives free to shriek and throw feces. The current arrangement is neither fish nor fowl, and being half a colony is worse than either being colonized or being free. The EU is not going to say dammit, these people can’t govern themselves, we’re turning the clock back to 1908 for the next generation. (Though, in practice, it did come pretty close.) So it has to try the other option and give them back real power — oh no! the p-word again! — including the power to screw up bigtime.

Given the speed at which these wheels turn, we’re looking at 1-2 years before that can happen, followed by, mm, another 4-5 years before the BiHers may put some non-dickhead representatives in place… the aforementioned electoral wash cycle. So we’re probably looking at 2010, more likely 2012 or so before serious constitutional reform is really on the table. Does Brussels have that sort of patience? You tell us.

Alternatives: we can elide point #1 and accept some cosmetic changes that won’t really make a difference in terms of giving power back to the center. I think this is unlikely, but given the various byes granted to some recent EU candidates and (cough) members, I don’t think it can quite be ruled out.

Or, we can elide point #3 and jam it down their throats. Presented as some combination of carrots and sticks and such, but netting out to an offer that really, really can’t be refused. I’m not saying good or bad here. I’m just saying that’s on the menu, and will certainly be considered after the first round of blandishments fail to produce any constructive response from Mujo and Haso.

Oh, and then there’s the nuclear option: give up on BiH altogether, pull a Congress of Berlin II: The Sequel!, and go for some sort of general regional rewrite of boundaries, powers and obligations. But that’s pretty wildly unlikely, so never mind.

Anyway. Another good post, and it is nice to see that Brussels is at least considering possibilities other than more of the same.

cheers,

Doug M.

Posted by: Doug Muir at March 14, 2005 09:21 PM

Blockquote works fine. Preview doesn’t give you anything like wysiwyg.

Posted by: David Weman at March 14, 2005 10:08 PM

Well, given that it took 15 years from the fall of the Wall to EU accession for even the most apt candidates, I’m not surprised that BiH and co. may take a bit longer.

Actually, I’m on the record here at AFOE as expecting Bosnians (and Herzegovinans, presumably) to vote for their first MEPs in 2014, so the time frame that Doug M. talks about above isn’t too far from my expectations.

Patience is something Brussels has in abundance. It’s results that are sometimes the problem…

Posted by: Doug at March 15, 2005 05:32 PM

David,

Thanks for the tip, will bear it in mind.

Doug M (exploiting my new knowledge),

The EU is not going to say dammit, these people can’t govern themselves, we’re turning the clock back to 1908 for the next generation.
Of course the EU (and US, and all the rest) did say more or less this when they gave the High Representative the Bonn powers in 1998. This is a policy with a natural sell-by date, because the international community doesn’t like paying for protectorates once sullen peace has replaced renewed war as the most likely alternative.

Dougs both,

One of the blind alleys the international community went down in post-war BiH was to buy the liberal Sarajevo consensus that the answer was to get the nationalists our of power, put the multi-ethnic opposition in power, and then let them get on with it. Quite apart from the fact that the electoral base of the opposition was basically limited to the greater Sarajevo and Tuzla areas, this was blown apart when the supposed non-nationalists got into power in 2001; they screwed up in government and lost the 2002 elections, a preliminary version of the wash-and-rinse cycle.

Ashdown’s agenda since then has included two key desiderata: i) depoliticising the means of state coercion (military and police) so that future nationalist governments will find it much more difficult to use them to do evil, and ii) constraining the political paths available to the nationalist governing parties to be in line with Euro-Atlantic integration. The future of BiH does not depend on eradicating nationalist parties (which is not possible) but on taming them.

Posted by: Brussels Gonzo at March 16, 2005 07:57 AM

A short sentence from an old, Bosnia born citizen: it is impossible a country like Dayton Bosnia can function now or ever, and it will be impossible to change Dayton Bosnia with nationalist parties here, and in the neighbourhood. So it will take too long for me to see different Bosnia, but even in grave, I will still believe in the possibility of Bosnia as state! The problems now, as 10 years ago, as 100 years ago are OTHER states and their interests!

Posted by: quod scripsi, scripsi at March 18, 2005 02:33 PM

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March Books 10) John Adams

10) John Adams, by David McCullough

Spotted this for €10 in our local English-language bookshop yesterday, and jumped at it, having heard so much about what a fantastic book it is. I have to say I was not completely satisfied.

Adams is of course one of the key characters of early U.S. history. First vice-president, second president, first president to live in the White House, first sitting president to lose re-election (only president to be defeated by his own vice-president), he lived to see his son in turn elected president, and eventually died on the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence.

Yet in fact his political career had basically peaked years before, roughly in 1785. He screwed up in his first weeks in office as vice-president by picking and losing a completely unnecessary battle over the protocol of the correct mode of address for the president, and never lived it down. Over the next eight years he became the first, if not the last, holder of the office to realise how impotent it was – though in fact he used the vice-president’s only real power, to break tied votes in the Senate, on more occasions than any of his successors. Similarly as president (the first real executive office he had ever held), his biggest mistake came right at the very beginning, when he kept on all of Washington’s incumbent cabinet, leaving it three years before he sacked any of them; and by then it was far too late. By the time he moved in to what we now call the White House in November 1800 he knew he was going to lose the coming election. (As McCullough points out, the result was closer than is generally remembered; but he still lost.)

Adams had been at his best in the years of the revolution, as a political activist and elected representative in the run-up to the Declaration of Independence, and as a diplomat, in particular his coup in the Hague in 1782, when he got both diplomatic recognition and, perhaps more important, money for the newly independent United States. He also had a glorious moment in 1785 – perhaps the real climax of his career – when he became the first American Ambassador to present his credentials in London, to the very same George III who he had excoriated only a few years before. McCullough paints those episodes very well, as he does the less successful years that followed.

But I felt that in general this book left too much unexplained and had too little reflection on what, if anything, we might have learnt from Adams’ life. I would have liked more discussion of, for instance, what Massachusetts was actually like in the 18th century; of why the Revolution happened when it did; of what the difference was between Republicans and Federalists (McCullough gives the impression that it was almost entirely a dispute between the respective fan clubs of Jefferson and Hamilton). The only assessment of Adams’ achievements comes at the end of his four years as president, and McCullough’s evaluation is I think much too positive, on the evidence he himself presents. Sure, Adams managed to steer the country away from a premature war with France, but a better leader would have sacked his Secretary of State for failing to follow his policy, and would have made more serious efforts to get public opinion on his side on the most crucial issue of the day. But there’s a telling quote from Adams in 1787 which explains some of this:

Popularity was never my mistress, nor was I ever, nor shall I ever be a popular man. But one thing I know, a man must be sensible of the errors of the people, and upon his guard against them, and must run the risk of their displeasure sometimes, or he will never do them any good in the long run.

One of the book’s strengths also points to one of its biggest weaknesses. The portrayal of the two key relationships of Adams’ personal and political life, with his wife Abigail and with his friend, vice-president, rival and successor Thomas Jefferson, is beautifully done, thanks to the survival of their diaries and most of their correspondence. (Including, oddly enough, a brief exchange between Jefferson and Abigail Adams in 1804, of which John Adams was unaware at the time.) The agonies of separation between the Adamses as his career takes him away from his wife and young family are all too believable. There’s a lovely moment in 1785 when Adams and Jefferson, their diplomatic efforts in England getting nowhere, take a week off work to go on a tour of English gardens. There’s a very sad moment in 1796 when Jefferson writes Adams a very gracious letter admitting defeat in that year’s presidential election, but is persuaded by James Madison (who in turn succeeded Jefferson as president twelve years later) not to send it.

But it would have been nice to have had a bit more of a feel of how outsiders saw these three people and their relationships. Right at the very end we hear that Adams’ supporters wished his wife had been with him in the last months of his presidency, so as to give him more backbone. It’s the first mention of the fact that she had a public image at all. And as I said earlier, the politics of the rift between Jefferson and Adams are simply not explained. We learn disappointingly little about Hamilton’s motives, or indeed about Hamilton at all. (I was a bit more satisfied with the treatment of Franklin and Washington.)

Primary sources, such as the voluminous correspondence of the Adams family (preserved from 1639 to 1889, taking up five miles of microfilm) are fantastic material. But I wish McCullough had pulled back from it a bit more often, to use secondary sources (or even better, other primary sources) for an idea of what other people thought was going on, and of the general context. For example, I already own a much more compelling description of the crucial elections of 1789, 1792, 1796 and 1800 in my battered copy of A History of Presidential Elections by Eugene H. Rosenboom. At least I can be reasonably well assured that McCullough’s account is more accurate than the other portrayal of Adams that I read recently, in Orson Scott Card’s Heartfire.

So in summary, a good book, but not as good as I had been led to expect.

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Belgian megaliths

When I was in my teens, I used to have this hobby of visiting ancient monuments – in particular standing stones and ringforts, of which there are plenty within a stone’s throw of the old family home in Loughbrickland, Co Down. There are a lot fewer around in Belgium (indeed, I suspect that the whole country has fewer prehistoric monuments than County Down). But I spent some time today trying to gather and systematise the information about them on the internet.

Blackraven’s site lists and maps the best ones in Belgium. I’ve grouped them geographically below with a note of driving time from my home.

West:
Hollain/Brunehaut. Biggest Belgian standing stone. 1h 23m drive.

South:
Velaine sur Sambre. Pierre qui Tourne. 52 min.
Charleroi. Carved standing stone, in the museum. 1h 1m.
Gozée. Standing Stone called the “Zeupire”. 1h 10m.
Boutonville. Pierre qui Tourne. 1h 40m.

Weris complex:
Wéris seems to be the Belgian Stonehenge. 1h 25m drive.
Solwaster. Possible sacrificial stone (natural formation). 1h 10m.
Waha. Pierre St Hubert. Near the oldest church in Belgium! 1h 17m.
Blantch Cayous d’Mouchny. Maybe a stone circle, maybe not. 1h 29m.
Forrières. Devil’s stones. 1h 19m.

South of Weris:
Gomery. Dolmen. Almost as far south as you can go in Belgium. 1h 57m drive.
Neufchâteau. Standing stone now in town square. 1h 33m.
Bohan. Pierre à Marier, moved from its original position. 1h 43m.

There is also a Belgian leylines site which lists a lot more, but with almost no information about them. At least in this case they are grouped by province, which makes it easier to plan how one might visit them. Again, driving time from my front door is noted.

Practically in the next village:
Dolmen in royal park in Tervuren (but moved from Duisburg). 18 minutes.

South of here:
Pierre-qui-Tourne, Court-St-Etienne. 31 min.
Perwez. Grosse Pierre. 33 mins.

East of here:
Lange Steen, Tienen. 24 min.
Chapel of Onze-Lieve-Vrouw-Ten-Steen in Hakendover (not clear if the stone itself is still there). 26 min.
prehistoric grotto in Jauche. 32 min.
Neerwinden/Middelwinden. Tumulus and menhir which may be Roman. 34 min.

South-West of Brussels:
Steenborre, Buizingen. 38 min.
Virginal-Samme. Wizard’s table. 47 min.

North of Brussels:
Zemst. “Elf-stone” or “Half-stone”. 27 min.

I must say I’m very attracted by the cluster south of Tienen. Once the weather gets better I can start exploring properly. And maybe take pictures to post here.

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Exploring livejournal

Proposed meme:

Pick ten livejournals at random. Write a brief impression on them, including how many steps they are from you.

, F 4 hops away from me. Based in Singapore (and linked to me via , though the two steps in between are both in the US). Aged 17. Entire journal friends locked.
, M 3 hops away from me. Aged 58, American but lives in Calgary; he has clearly been going through a rough time recently in terms of health and career. Reads a lot of theology.
, 4 hops away from me. Community for eight Toronto-based aspiring sf writers. Last public post is from August but there have been a dozen or so more since. Activity apears to be tailing off.
, M 4 hops away from me. Aged 21, student in Utrecht. He used to post a lot about parties (less posting recently). Writes in Dutch.
, F? 4 hops away from me. Lives in California. Friends locked journal, but website reveals interest in manga and age of 22.
, M 4 hops away from me. Aged 27, lives in Moscow, writes in Russian. Mainly posts about gadgets, and the weather.
, F 5 hops from me. Aged 20, student in Rochester NY, hasn’t updated since August.
, M 3 hops from me. Aged 32, lives in St Petersburg, writes in Russian. Seems rather witty (as far as I can tell via on-line translation).
, F 4 hops from me. Aged 23, lives in Russia, writes in Russian.

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The Return of Doctor Who

Yes, I am looking forward to it.

I got 14 out of 20 in the Guardian quiz published on Friday.

And I’m preparing myself by reading the SFX Doctor Who special. Highlight so far: Interview with Tom Baker, who is now 71 and has obviously been preparing to be that age for most of his life:

The thing is about awful people like Mary Whitehouse, etc, is that they provide us with the raw material of satire. Most of them are beyond parody, but we try. The real people weren’t as interesting as the puppets on Spitting Image, so they started to behave like the puppets. Roy Hattersley, who didn’t slobber that much, became a slobberer. Mrs Thatcher started smoking cigars…

It’s that last bit of surrealism that takes him out of the territory of cantankerous old codger and into alternative reality.

On a related topic, it’s good to see that even those who are 98% Nerd may know very little of Star Trek!

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Thanks (if that’s the word) to

Bourbon
Congratulations! You’re 120 proof, with specific scores in beer (60) , wine (116), and liquor (78).
Screw all that namby-pamby chick stuff, you’re going straight for the
bottle and a shot glass! It’ll take more than a few shots of Wild
Turkey or 99 Bananas before you start seeing pink elephants. You know
how to handle your alcohol, and yourself at parties.

My test tracked 4 variables How you compared to other people your age and gender:

You scored higher than 34% on proof
You scored higher than 86% on beer index
You scored higher than 95% on wine index
You scored higher than 86% on liquor index

Link: The Alcohol Knowledge Test written by hoppersplit on Ok Cupid

Trekkie Appreciator
Congratulations! You scored 43%!
You don’t mind Star Trek and have obviously watched a couple of
episodes or movies, but you don’t live or breathe the world. Well done!
You’ve managed to tread the fine line between sci-fi buff and Star Trek
nerd (otherwise known as the difference between enjoying Star Trek for
its entertainment value and running around with a batleth quoting
Klingon battle poetry).

My test tracked 1 variable How you compared to other people your age and gender:

You scored higher than 14% on Trekkies

Link: The Trekkie Test written by MadameBoffin on Ok Cupid

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March Books 9) Strangers in Paradise

9) Strangers in Paradise, Pocket Book #2, by Terry Moore

Read the first one of these last year, and much enjoyed it, as I enjoyed this second volume. Here we get sucked a little into stories of ten-years-on and ten-years-before, as well as the political thriller storyline which passes for the main plot. Not as deep and thought-provoking as some comics that I have read, but sometimes it’s enough to read something that is just about interesting people rather than Big Important Issues.

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Crunch for Croatia

by Brussels Gonzo (originally published on A Fistful of Euros)

Hi folks, I am your guest blogger for the next two weeks. I hope you’ll allow me to be a little coy about my identity; but I do work in Brussels, in the general field of international politics.

I usually forget to check the European Parliament’s calendar of next week’s events on Friday afternoon, though really I should do it as a matter of routine, to plan ahead for the coming week. (And really they should have a direct link from the front page of their website, rather than three clicks away; but there’s not much point in wasting blogspace on stating the obvious about the crap design of the EU institutions’ websites.)

Along with the usual tedium of schedules for a conference in Cairo that nobody I know will go to, and such marvels as the European Parliament’s desperate attempt to make itself relevant to the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, there is one potentially very interesting meeting on the agenda.

On Wednesday afternoon, the Foreign Affairs Committee will be discussing Croatia’s EU application with Vladimir Drobnjak, Croatia’s ambassador to the UN and its Chief Negotiator. This will be the day before Croatia’s EU membership talks would have started, were it not for Zagreb’s failure to catch fugitive general and war crimes indictee Ante Gotovina. (Who knows – in the next few days he may hand himself in, and prove my forecast wrong. But I’m not counting on it.)

The extraordinary events of last week in Kosovo – where the Prime Minister, Ramush Haradinaj, resigned and went quietly to the Hague following his indictment, successfully urging restraint on his own supporters, surely now must increase pressure on both Zagreb and Belgrade to draw a line under the past by dealing with the loose ends from the wars of the 1990s. Zagreb’s protests – that they don’t know where Gotovina is – are answered by the war crimes tribunal with the accusation that this is for want of trying.

(The Serbian government’s protests to the same effect are not widely believed in Belgrade, let alone in the Hague. A senior government official there recently told me, “I’d send my own mother to the war crimes tribunal, if they asked, so that Serbia could fulfill the EU’s conditions. Unfortunately the people who matter in this government don’t see it the same way.”)

There is a valid question about whether or not a war crimes tribunal is the best way to go in resolving conflicts. In other cases, political compromises between old and new regimes, or truth and reconciliation commissions, or both have been used. The fact that the ICTY has proved to be genuinely independent, especially in the way it has not felt constrained by anyone else’s political inconvenience when issuing indictments, has been a source of frustration to many in the Balkans. (Some of my more excitable friends even claimed that Carla del Ponte bore some of the responsibility for the assassination of Zoran Djindjic – an absurd assertion: the blame belongs entirely with those who planned and carried out the killing.)

However, IMHO that is all irrelevant by now. The international community, including the UN and all the relevant governments, signed up to ICTY when it was set up and they have no choice but to follow it through to the end. It also seems to me that the removal of war crimes indictees has generally had a positive effect on the ground. Look, for instance, at Kozarac, near Prijedor where the first two arrests by SFOR were made in July 1997: then a blasted landscape of ruined houses, now one of Bosnia’s best examples of refugee return. And just imagine how much worse the political scene would be now in Belgrade if Milosevic and Seselj were still in situ, either glowering from their prison cells or, worse, at liberty to whip up their supporters.

Considering that Kosovo is so far behind Croatia in so many other ways, it surely cannot be comfortable for Croatian officials to reflect that the UN protectorate has a perfect score on the one political condition that is keeping Croatia from EU membership negotiations. Vladimir Drobnjak is one of the most impressive negotiators and diplomats I have encountered from any country, let alone from the region, but he has been handed a very difficult situation to try and explain to the European parliament on Wednesday. I expect he will rise to the occasion: I’ll certainly be there myself, and will report back here.

And the first person to greet me with the words, “You are Brussels Gonzo, and I claim my free drink” will get a glass of wine (or equivalent) from me at the hemicycle bar.

Comments

Being a de facto protectorate Kosovo really can’t say no and the prime minister knew it. Very brave of him personally, but where’s the political comparison headed?

Posted by: Oliver at March 13, 2005 10:55 AM

The Kosovo Albanians have plenty of choice in the matter. NATO troops in the nearby protectorate of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been unable to catch Radovan Karadzic for nine years now. If Haradinaj had decided to run for the hills, he could probably have made a go of it; if he’d wanted to urge a popular rebellion against international authority, well, I don’t really want to speculate what the outcome might have been.

Croatia and Serbia have every incentive to comply with the war crimes tribunal due to the demands of Euro-Atlantic integration, just as Kosovo does due to its somewhat different situation; but it doesn’t work unless the leaders at the very top make the decision to go in that direction. On that basis Pristina is ahead of Zagreb and Belgrade at the moment.

Posted by: Brussels Gonzo at March 13, 2005 10:43 PM

Is there a hope for Kosovo’s independance, if the EU is commited to preventing it?
Can the EU make a credible threat to the independance of Croatia or Serbia?

Posted by: Oliver at March 14, 2005 08:22 AM

Hi Gonzo,

Great post, and I also agree with you WRT Kosovo and Haradinaj. I do have a couple of quibbles, though.

1) I don’t think del Ponte bears blame for the killing of Djindjic. The key factor there was that, after two years of compromise and failed appeasement, Djindjic was showing some willingness to move against the Red Berets and the whole foul nodulus of corruption, crime and violence swirling around them. They turned on Djindjic because it looked like he was getting ready to start clipping their wings, not because of del Ponte or the Hague

However, this doesn’t let del Ponte off the hook. Her botching of the Milosevic trial at a tactical level made it harder for Djindjic to cooperate with the Hague, and has given aid and comfort to bad actors in the region for a while now.

2) It’s going to be bitchin’ hard to convict Haradinaj (which is why I was mildly surprised that they indicted him). Albanians are clannish and close-mouthed even by Balkan standards, the Kosovo guerilla movements didn’t leave much of a paper trail, and a certain amount of useful information is locked firmly in the archives of the military and security agencies of various NATO powers. So he could go off to the Hague with a rather high degree of confidence IMO.

As to Croatia: FWIW, I’m rooting for the EU to take a firm line. The region needs it, and it will set a valuable precedent when it’s time to talk accession with Serbia, Albania, Bosnia, and even Turkey. I live in Romania, BTW, and I think the EU has been absurdly lenient on accession negotiations here. The pattern that’s emerging so far is that Brussels will huff and puff, but in the end will always roll over rather than upset the prearranged schedule. That’s a paradigm that really needs to be broken.

cheers,

Doug M.

Posted by: Doug Muir at March 14, 2005 10:36 AM

Doug,

I think the Hague’s lack of concern for the consequences of how it handles the cases stems from ICTY’s concept of itself as truly independent; but I suspect that a different approach on their part could have made “independent” seem less of a synonym for “unhelpful”.

I hear that the evidence against Haradinaj has been mostly submitted by the Serbs, in which case a lot of it may well fall apart anyway (some has already been disproved, murder victims still being alive, etc). NATO folks had very little on him.

Totally agreed on Romania – have you seen Tom Gallagher’s new book? – but I think the Bucharest chickens are coming to roost in Zagreb. If in no other way, Croatia’s application is linked to Turkey’s in that the EU has a new tougher policy.

BG.

Posted by: Brussels Gonzo at March 14, 2005 11:01 AM

Oliver,

The EU (and the international community as a whole) isn’t anywhere near reaching a consensus view on Kosovo independence. EU foreign ministers stated last month that a return to the pre-1999 situation is not on the cards, but that still leaves a very large range of options.

So nobody is in the position of being able to make a credible and immediate promise of alliance with the Kosovo Albanians to deliver independence, let alone of threatening to withhold it if they misbehave.

BG

Posted by: Brussels Gonzo at March 14, 2005 11:09 AM

I’m with Oliver on this.

Croatia can alwasy proclaim that Euro-Atlantic integrations, financial incentives, international co-operation etc. is simply not worth losing “national dignity”. Croatian politicians can always pull the plug on the whole EU/NATO process. In couple of years Croatia will become pariah with living standards of North Korea, but, at least theoretically, it will remain an independent state, and, last but not least, the regime responsible for that policy shift can expect at least couple of years before international community or domestic opposition gets its act together and make serious effort of changing it.

Kosovo, for all the reasons, mentioned by other commentators, can’t use this option.

Posted by: Dragan Antulov at March 14, 2005 11:46 AM

BG
Be warned, that free drink may well be claimed. But maybe not this Wednesday – though spies willé be sent to AFET, just in case.

Posted by: Elaib at March 14, 2005 03:52 PM

Terrific post. But I agree with some of the comments above about the “unhelpfulness” of some of the ICTY’s tactics and maneuverings. The biggest problem to me (aside from incompetence in some prosecutions and the unnecessary fight that the ICTY picked with American news organizations over compelled testimony) is the use/abuse of the “sealed” indictment. There would have been short term hiccups if all indictments were made publicly at the time of their creation, but players would have known where they stood. The sealed indictment and its lack of transparency has created unnecessary paranoia and ill will.

Posted by: Richard at March 14, 2005 04:18 PM

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Public now

From today’s RFE/RL newsline:

AZERBAIJANI POLICE APPREHENDED IN CONNECTION WITH KIDNAPPINGS. Azerbaijan’s National Security Ministry launched a major operation early on 10 March at multiple locations in and near Baku and in the Gusar Raion in northern Azerbaijan during which it secured the release of Zamira Gadjieva, wife of the president of the International Bank of Azerbaijan, Turan and zerkalo.az reported on 10 and 11 March, respectively. Gadjieva was abducted in Baku a month ago by a group that demanded $20 million for her release. She was found in a concrete bunker belonging to a senior police official who was apprehended together with some 20 other people, seven of them Interior Ministry officials. It is not clear whether the group was also responsible for a series of recent abductions of relatives of prominent officials, none of which have been solved.

Extraordinary.

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My religion

You scored as Christianity. Your views are most similar to those of Christianity. Do more research on Christianity and possibly consider being baptized and accepting Jesus, if you aren’t already Christian.

Christianity is the second of the Abrahamic faiths; it follows Judaism and is followed by Islam. It differs in its belief of Jesus, as not a prophet nor historical figure, but as God in human form. The Holy Trinity is the concept that God takes three forms: the Father, the Son (Jesus), and the Holy Ghost (sometimes called Holy Spirit). Jesus taught the idea of instead of seeking revenge, one should love his or her neighbors and enemies.

Christianity

67%

Buddhism

63%

Islam

58%

paganism

50%

Satanism

38%

agnosticism

33%

Hinduism

29%

Judaism

21%

atheism

17%

Which religion is the right one for you? (new version)
created with QuizFarm.com


The Beliefnet quiz:

1. Mainline to Liberal Christian Protestants (100%)
2. Liberal Quakers (85%)
3. Orthodox Quaker (78%)
4. Eastern Orthodox (76%)
5. Roman Catholic (76%)
6. Unitarian Universalism (76%)
7. Reform Judaism (72%)
8. Mainline to Conservative Christian/Protestant (64%)
9. Sikhism (61%)
10. Seventh Day Adventist (56%)
11. Bahá’í Faith (54%)
12. Neo-Pagan (52%)
13. Orthodox Judaism (52%)
14. Islam (48%)
15. New Age (46%)
16. Secular Humanism (43%)
17. Mahayana Buddhism (43%)
18. Theravada Buddhism (41%)
19. Hinduism (39%)
20. New Thought (38%)
21. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) (37%)
22. Scientology (34%)
23. Taoism (30%)
24. Jainism (30%)
25. Christian Science (Church of Christ, Scientist) (26%)
26. Nontheist (21%)
27. Jehovah’s Witness (19%)

No Liberal Catholic option. But then perhaps there are fewer of us in America than in Belgium (where our local church prays to “God, father and mother of us all”).

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Only in Belgium (surely…)

Received today from the SN Brussels Airlines frequent flyer programme:

Make your own passion movie and win a free ticket!

Passion is in our nature and our passion is you.
Click here and discover why SN is an airline unlike any other.

Most of all, you can now make your own passion movie here and send it to your friends. Every participant has a chance to win 1 of the 100 free tickets.

So get in the director’s seat and have a go!

I’m sorry, but there are some lengths I am not prepared to go to for a free plane ticket!

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01. Nicholas Whyte on Brüsselis asuva Rahvusvahelise Kriisirühma Euroopa programmi juhataja
02. Nicholas Whyte je ředitelem Evropského programu Skupiny pro mezinárodní krize se sídlem v Bruselu
03. Nicholas Whyte merkezi Brüksel’de bulunan Uluslararası Kriz Grubu’nun Avrupa Programı başkanıdır
04. Nicholas Whyte is de directeur van het Europa Programma van de Internationale Crisisgroep
05. Nicholas Whyte a brüsszeli központú Nemzetközi Válság Csoport Európa-programjának igazgatója
06. Nicholas Whyte er forstöðumaður Evrópuáætlunar International Crisis Group, sem hefur aðsetur í Brussels
07. Nicholas Whyte er direktør for Den Internationale Krisegruppes Europa-program i Bruxelles
08. Nicholas Whyte er direktør for den Brussel-baserte Internasjonale krisegruppens Europa-program
09. Nicholas Whyte jest dyrektorem Programu Europejskiego brukselskiej Międzynarodowej Grupy Kryzysowej
10. Nicholas Whyte ─ Briuselyje įsikūrusios Tarptautinės krizių grupės Europos programos direktorius
11. Ο Nicholas Whyte είναι διευθυντής του Ευρωπαϊκού Προγράμματος της Ομάδας Διεθνούς Κρίσης
12. Nicholas Whyte è direttore del Programma europeo del Gruppo per le crisi
internazionali, con sede a Bruxelle
13. Nicholas Whyte é director do Programa da Europa do Grupo Internacional de Crise baseado em Bruxelas
14. Nicholas Whyte ist Direktor des Europaprogramms der in Brüssel ansässigen
Internationalen Krisengruppe
15. Nicholas Whyte es director del Programa Europeo del ”Grupo Internacional de
Crisis” con sede en Bruselas
16. Nicholas Whyte je direktor Programa za Evropo pri Mednarodni krizni skupini
s sedežem v Bruslju
17. Nicholas Whyte est directeur du programme Europe au Groupe international de
crise basé à Bruxelles

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Guess which country?

From my local source:

Great number of high-ranking officials of the Minister of Interior were arrested today under a special operation of the Minister of National Security and department of struggle against organized crime. Up to 20 high ranking police and employees of Interior Ministry were arrested due to involvement in kidnapping. So far, many kidnappings and abductions happened in [the capital] and most of them have not been solved. Many think that, this is the biggest group, which abducted many famous wealthy people and businessman in [the country].

The serious thing is that the kidnappers were headed by the Colonel of the Criminal Investigation Department of Ministry of Interior!

The incident:

Approximately a month ago, the wife of the owner of [a big bank] was kidnapped near the [presidential building]. The kidnappers were demanding the ransom of 6 million EUR. Meanwhile, the [big bank] is the most wealthy bank with huge financial resources.

Today in the morning several tens of employees of the Ministry of National Security conducted unprecedented large-scale operation for neutralizing the organized criminal group which for a long time dealt in kidnapping people for ransom. The operation was carried out in several places at once. The criminals were taken by surprise and they did not resist.

Spouse of the Head of the [big bank] was set free during the operation, she was kidnapped a month ago. The kidnappers demanded ransom 6 million EUR. The criminals kept her in a bunker belonging to the high-ranking official of the Ministry of Interior, the Colonel of the Criminal Investigation Department. He was detained in the bunker and large arsenal of arms was found there too. His nephew, Deputy Chairman of [another bank] was also the member of the criminal group and was suspected for organization of kidnapping

Approximately 20 people have been detained. Among them there are other senior officials of police. A number of kidnappings of the members of senior officials’ families has taken place lately in [capital]. It is supposed that the group was involved in those kidnappings and other noted crimes. Today’s arrests testify about serious criminalization of law enforcement bodies what will have most serious consequences for leadership of the Ministry of Interior.


Of course, this won’t make it into Western media at all. But I think it’s extraordinary.

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Gee, guys…

…I just discovered that eleven of you cared enough to vote for my livejournal as the “Weblog Most Deserving of Wider Recognition” in the First European Weblog Awards announced back at the start of February. Since I forgot to vote myself, and had no idea that I was even on the shortlist, I am really not at all surprised that I came joint last in the category; but am awfully pleased that eleven people none the less cast their votes for me.

Maybe next year I might even campaign!

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 The ‘Tempting Fate’ meme (For I am a sheep):

1. Make an LJ-cut post with “DO NOT READ” as the text.
2. Do not select a ‘mood’ for this post.
3. If anyone clicks the cut, they are to comment and admit to doing so.
4. Anyone who reads this also has to do the same in THEIR journal, thus continuing the neverending madness.

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Fame at last!

Janis Ian has linked to my site from hers! (The word “hours”, in the very last sentence.)

I’d better try and find some of her music and see if I like it. She seems to have inspired a lot of good stories in that Stars anthology.

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Reviews

Interested by the current spate of posts on reviews, such as those by here, here, and here (also check out ‘s satirical take on it).

I do mostly positive reviews for my own website, with a few exceptions, basically because I tend to spend money on and enjoy writing about books that I actually like. Writing here, I tend not to go on and on about bad books, but I do sometimes write a lot about books I’ve particularly enjoyed (usually non-fiction, like this, that and the other). However, I’ve also done a few reviews for Infinity Plus, most of which have been negative, basically because I owe it to the editor to at least be honest once he has sent me the book, especially since I haven’t paid for it and it costs him money to send them to me.

What has tended to surprise me when I google the books I don’t like is that most reviews seem to be very positive. I think this basically indicates that most people prefer to write about books they liked than about books they didn’t. No doubt there is also a bit of a phenomenon of authors asking their friends to write nice things about them. Night Travels of the Elven Vampire was an unusual case.

I feel that the reviewer has a duty to be honest about his or her feelings. If you are able to write about the books you don’t like, it makes your opinion of the books you do like more valuable. I think.

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Love

One of my colleague appears to be in love. He has sent me semi-accidentally three weeks’ worth of emails with a girl he is getting to know. Very amusing. He’s really really keen and she’s not quite ready to be committed (but seems increasingly less reluctant). Ah well, I can facilitate the process by replying to his simple request for information.

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Oh well, not this time

So, looks like I got bumped from the Ten O’Clock News by a combination of the IRA and Aslan Maskhadov. Frankly I’m glad that things are sufficiently calm in Kosovo that it is unable to compete…

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March Books 8) The Saliva Tree

8) The Saliva Tree, by Brian Aldiss

Actually a collection, including the title story which shared a Nebula with Zelazny’s “He Who Shapes” (later expanded to The Dream Master). Several of the stories are non-sf – two about serial killers, whcih slightly surprised me, and one about the death of the medieval Serbian ruler Vukasin Mrnjavcevic. All exceedingly good stuff if you like your Aldiss, which I do.

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